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Abstract
Classical decision theory models behaviour in terms of utility maximi-
sation where utilities represent rational preference relations over outcomes.
However, empirical evidence and theoretical considerations suggest that we
need to go beyond this framework. We propose to represent goals by higher-
order functions or operators that take other functions as arguments where
the max and argmax operators are special cases. Our higher-order functions
take a context function as their argument where a context represents a pro-
cess from actions to outcomes. By that we can define goals being dependent
on the actions and the process in addition to outcomes only. This formula-
tion generalises outcome based preferences to context-dependent goals. We
show how to uniformly represent within our higher-order framework clas-
sical utility maximisation but also various other extensions that have been
debated in economics.
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1 Introduction
Rational choice theory provides an elegant and succinct framework in order
to model individual choices. The representation of agents’ goals and their
choices as utility maximisation has created a rich theory that is flexible and
has vast applications. Despite its importance, rational choice theory does
have its limitations. These limitations are conceptual as well as empirical
and they are well documented in the literature.
The standard mathematical representation of goals as rational prefer-
ence relations1 or alternatively as utility functions, can be too restrictive –
useful for many applications but not for all. Several issues have been iden-
tified. Take, for instance, the standard assumption that individuals’ pref-
erence relations are complete. There has been a long debate as to whether
this is a reasonable requirement, and several solutions have been proposed
[1, 3, 13, 14, 17].
Furthermore, there are numerous examples of decision procedures where
the agents either do not not fully maximise – like the satisficing behaviour
of Herbert Simon – or they may adhere to various decision heuristics which
violate for example the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
like menu dependent or second best decision procedures [9, 17].
A fundamental, often implicit, assumption is that people only care about
the final outcomes of their decisions. Conceptually, it is not obvious why ra-
tional decision makers should be concerned with consequences of their actions
only, without considering the action itself [17].
Therefore, given the conceptual and empirical deficiencies, there are good
reasons to not limit decision theory to the rational choice paradigm. Many of
the proposed solutions, however, only attempt to represent seemingly ‘non-
rational’ behaviours as rational ones. This includes the creation of an ex-
tended outcome space, where aspects of the decision process are explicitly
represented as outcomes [17]. Alternatively, several papers propose to ra-
tionalise choice by multiple rationales [9] or to represent the preferences by
multivalued utility functions [13, 3]. In all cases, the decision problem is usu-
ally artificially manipulated by the economist in order to represent the agent
“as if” he would decide given some rational preference relation or maximise a
utility function, even if it is clear from the description of the decision process
that actually nothing like that takes place.
In this paper we provide a new approach based on higher-order functions
that unifies the behavioural patterns mentioned above with the classical ap-
1Typically, a preference relation is defined to be rational, if it is total and transitive,
see [11, 15, 10]
2
proach based on rational behaviour and utility maximisation. A higher-order
function (or functional) is a function whose domain is itself a set of func-
tions. This paper relies on a framework that has been developed in computer
science [4, 5] as a game theoretical approach to proof theory2. We extend
and apply this approach to decision theory.3
The core concept is that we model agents’ goals as quantifiers, i.e. higher-
order functions of type (X → R)→ R, where X → R is a space of functions
from the set of choices X to the set of possible outcomes R. Quantifiers
describe which outcomes an agent considers to be good. A corresponding
notion is that of a selection function, i.e. a higher-order function of type
(X → R) → X which calculates a choice that meets the desired goal. We
take functions of type X → R to represent a decision context such that for-
mulating goals as quantifiers boils down to describing the preferred outcomes
for any given decision context. The decision of an agent described by a quan-
tifier takes place in a context and by that the agent can take into account
the process from actions to outcomes.
Since the max: (X → R) → R operator is a quantifier and the corre-
sponding argmax: (X → R) → X operator is a selection function, we can
show how to instantiate our higher-order approach with these operators such
that the usual utility functions and preference relations are instances of our
modelling framework.
We also show how our framework captures alternatives to the usual ratio-
nality assumption. More specifically, our framework addresses the relevance
of the choice act itself since quantifiers and selection functions take the de-
cision context as input such that context-dependent goals can be seamlessly
modelled. The outcome space in our formulation of goals can have any ar-
bitrary structure and is not restricted in order to be representable by utility
functions (or, equivalently, rational preferences). In particular, we can model
preference relations that are incomplete. Moreover, our framework allows to
model arbitrary heuristics (e.g. second best choice, median procedure, etc.)
directly, without the need for a multivariable representation. Finally, we
show that quantifiers themselves can be used to model behaviour directly at
the level of higher-order functions. We will show how to represent the ab-
stract concerns of coordination and differentiation as fixpoint operators that
are higher-order functions as well. In other words, our framework is able to
represent existing models but it can also be used to formulate new ones.
2Proof theory is a branch of mathematical logic which investigates the structure and
meaning of formal mathematical proofs. It has been recently discovered that certain
proofs of high logical complexity can be interpreted as computer programs which compute
equilibria of suitable generalised games.
3In the companion paper [7], we extend the higher-order framework to game theory.
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We do not aim to provide an answer to the question of which paradigm
should be used in order to model a particular phenomenon. Instead, we
introduce our framework such that different approaches can be captured as
instances of the same abstraction. Our contribution is to provide a powerful
organising framework and a very expressive mathematical language. In this
framework we can clarify the relation between different models, highlight
their commonalities and differences and allow for their combinations.
The paper is organized as follows: We introduce and explain higher-order
functions in the next section. Then, we instantiate rational preferences as
well as utility maximisation as special cases in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5
we introduce a series of deviations from classical choice theory and show how
they can be represented by higher-order functions. We conclude in Section
6.
2 Agents as Quantifiers
A higher-order function (or functional) is a function whose domain is itself
a set of functions. Given sets X and Y we denote by X → Y the set of
all functions with domain X and codomain Y . A higher-order function is
therefore a function f : (X → Y )→ Z where X , Y and Z are sets.
There are examples of higher-order functions that are well familiar to
economists. In case of the maximisation of a utility function u : X → R
max
x∈X
u(x)
the max operator takes the utility function u : X → R as its input and returns
a real number maxx∈X u(x) as the output. Thereore, the max operator has
type
max: (X → R)→ R
In a similar vein, the argmax operator is also a higher-order function of a
particular type:
argmax: (X → R)→ P(X)
where P(X) is the set of subsets of X . For a given function u : X → R we
have that argmax(u) is the set of points where u attains its maximum value.
2.1 Agent Context
We want to model an agent A in an economic situation or context and
formulate his motivations and his choices. We shall model such contexts as
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mappings X → R that encode for choices in X their effects on the outcomes
in R.
Definition 2.1 (Agent context). We call any function p : X → R a possible
context for the agent A who is choosing a move from a set X, having in sight
a final outcome in a set R,
For instance, X could be the set of available flights between two cities,
and R = R+ could be the set of positive real numbers that represent prices.
An agent who is interested in choosing a flight having in mind only the cost
of the flight will consider the price list X → R+ as a sufficient context for
his decision. If, however, the number of stops (or changes) is an important
factor in the decision of the agent, we could take R = R+×N and the agent’s
context would then be X → R+ × N.
2.2 Quantifiers
Suppose the agent A has to make a decision in the context p : X → R. The
agent will consider some of the possible outcomes to be good (or acceptable),
and others to be bad (or unacceptable). Such choices define a higher-order
function of the following type:
Definition 2.2 (Quantifier, [4, 5]). Mappings
ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R)
from contexts p : X → R to sets of outcomes ϕ(p) ⊆ R are called quantifiers.4
We model agents A as quantifiers ϕA and take ϕA(p) as the set of out-
comes that the agent A considers preferable in each context p : X → R. Our
main objective in this paper is to convince the reader that this is a general,
modular, and highly flexible way of describing an agent’s goal or objective.
The classical example of a quantifier is utility maximisation. Suppose
an agent has a utility function u′ : R → R mapping outcomes into utilities.
Composing the context p : X → R and u′ : R→ R we get a new context that
maps actions directly into utility u : X → R. Given this new context, the
good outcomes for the player are precisely those for which his utility function
is maximal. This quantifier is given by
max(u) = {r ∈ Im(u) | r ≥ u(x′) for all x′ ∈ X}
where Im(u) denotes the image of the utility function u : X → R.
4The terminology comes from the observation that the usual existential ∃ and universal
∀ quantifiers of logic can be seen as operations of type (X → B)→ B, where B is the type of
booleans. Mostowski [12] has called arbitrary functionals of type (X → B)→ B generalised
quantifiers. This was generalised further in [4] to the type given here.
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2.3 Context-dependence
In general, we are going to allow the set of outcomes that the agent considers
good to be totally arbitrary. It is reasonable, however, to assume that for
each context p : X → R we have ϕ(p) 6= ∅. This is to say that in any given
context the agent must have a preferred outcome (even if this would be the
least bad one). We will call such quantifiers total. Another more interesting
class of quantifiers consists of those we call context-independent :
Definition 2.3 (Context-independence). A quantifier ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R)
is said to be context-independent if the value ϕ(p) only dependents on Im(p),
i.e.
Im(p) = Im(p′) =⇒ ϕ(p) = ϕ(p′).
Dually, a quantifier ϕ will be called context-dependent if for some contexts
p and p′, with Im(p) = Im(p′), the sets of preferred outcomes ϕ(p) and ϕ(p′)
are different.
Intuitively, a context-dependent quantifier will select good outcomes not
only based on which outcomes are possible, but will also take into account
how the outcomes are actually achieved. It is easy to see that the quantifier
max is context-independent, since it can be written as a function of Im(p)
only.
Our prototypical example of a context-dependent quantifier is the fixpoint
operator
fix : (X → X)→ P(X)
Recall that a fixpoint of a function f : X → X is a point x ∈ X satisfying
f(x) = x. If the set of moves is equal to the set of outcomes then there is a
quantifier whose good outcomes are precisely the fixpoints of the context. If
the context has no fixpoints we shall assume that the agent will be equally
satisfied with any outcome. Such a quantifier is given by
fix(p) =
{
{x ∈ X | p(x) = x} if nonempty
X otherwise.
Clearly fix(·) is context-dependent, since we could have different contexts
p, p′ : X → X having the same image set Im(p) = Im(p′) but with p and p′
having different sets of fixpoints. For example, if we take p, p′ : R→ R to be
given by p(x) = x and p′(x) = −x then Im(p) = Im(p′) = R, but fix(p) = R
and fix(p′) = {0}. We will discuss the economic relevance of this particular
quantifier in Section 5 where we discuss reflexive agents.
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2.4 Attainability
Another important property of quantifiers that we shall consider is that of
attainability :
Definition 2.4 (Attainability). A quantifier ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R) is called
attainable if, for every context p : X → R, for some r ∈ ϕ(p) there exists an
x such that p(x) = r. (In particular, attainable quantifiers are total.)
In other words, an agent modelled by an attainable quantifier will select
at least one preferred outcome r that is actually achievable by some move
x. An equivalent definition is that ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R) is attainable if and
only if
ϕ(p) ∩ Im(p) 6= ∅.
Remark 2.5. We could also define a strong attainability notion whereby all
r ∈ ϕ(p) need to be achievable by some x ∈ X, i.e.
ϕ(p) ⊆ Im(p).
For our purposes the weaker notion of Definition 2.4 has been sufficient and
reasonably well-behaved.
Attainable quantifiers bring out the relevance of moves in the decision
making process. Sometimes an agent might actually wish to spell out the
preferred moves instead of the preferred outcomes. This leads to the defini-
tion of another class of higher-order functions:
Definition 2.6 (Selection functions). A selection function5 is any function
of type
ε : (X → R)→ P(X)
Similarly to quantifiers, the canonical example of a selection function is
miximising R, defined by
argmax(p) = {x ∈ X | p(x) ≥ p(x′) for all x′ ∈ X}
The argmax selection function is naturally multi-valued: a function may
attain its maximum value at several different points.
5In the computer science literature where selection functions have been considered pre-
viously [4, 5] the focus was on single-valued ones. However, as multi-valued selection
functions are extremely important in our examples we have adapted the definitions ac-
cordingly.
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Proposition 2.7. A quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R) is attainable if and
only if there exists a total selection function ε : (X → R)→ P(X) such that,
for all p : X → R,
x ∈ ε(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ ϕ(p)
If such a relationship between a quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R) and
a selection function ε : (X → R) → P(X) holds then we shall say that ε
attains ϕ. The attainability relation holds between the quantifier max and
the selection function argmax. The fixpoint quantifier is also a selection
function, and it attains itself since
x ∈ fix(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ fix(p).
3 Utility Maximisation and Preference Rela-
tions
In this section we relate the concepts of quantifiers and selection functions
to the standard concepts of classical decision theory: utility functions and
preference relations. In particular, we show that both correspond to context-
independent quantifiers that have the same structure. We now want to char-
acterise the relationship between preference relations and context-independent
quantifiers.
3.1 Preference Relations and Context-Independent Quan-
tifiers
Suppose R is the set of possible outcomes, and an agent has a partial order
relation  on R as preferences, so that x  y means that the agent prefers
the outcome x to y. These partial orders lead to choice functions f : P(R)→
P(R) where f(S) are the maximal elements in the set of possible outcomes
S with respect to the order . Note that these f satisfy f(S) ⊆ S, and
f(S) 6= ∅ for non-empty S.
Every such f can be turned into a quantifier ϕ in a generic way, using
the fact that the image operator is a higher-order function Im : (X → R)→
P(R):
(X → R)
Im
−→ P(R)
f
−→ P(R)
so that f ◦ Im: (X → R)→ P(R) are quantifiers.
Proposition 3.1. Assume |X| ≥ |R|, such that the number of choices is
bigger than the number of possible outcomes. Then a quantifier ϕ : (X →
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R)→ P(R) is context-independent if and only if ϕ = f ◦ Im, for some choice
function f : P(R)→ P(R).
Proof. If ϕ = f ◦ Im then ϕ is context-independent. For the other direction,
note that since |X| ≥ |R| we have for any subset S ⊆ R a map uS : X → R
such that Im(uS) = S. Assume ϕ is context-independent and let us define
f(S) = ϕ(uS). Clearly,
ϕ(p) = ϕ(uIm(p)) = f(Im(p))
where the first step uses that ϕ is context-independent and that Im(p) =
Im(uIm(p)) by the assumption on the family of maps uS, while the second
steps simply uses the definition of f .
Agents who are defined by context-independent quantifiers are choosing
the set of good outcomes simply by ranking the set of outcomes that can be
achieved in a given context but are ignoring all the information about how
each of the outcomes arise from particular choices of moves.
For instance, we might have a set of actions that will lead us to earn some
large sums of money. Some of these, however, might be illicit. A classical
agent who cares only about the direct consequences of his decision and is
defined in a context-independent way would choose the outcome that gives
himself the maximum sum of money, regardless of the nature of action. If
however the agent also cares about the actions themselves and their indi-
rect consequences, he might not consider the largest amount of money as
preferable. As outlined in the introduction a standard remedy in order to
include such implicit concerns is to extend the outcome space. This can be a
necessary correction by the analyst if the initial outcome space was truly mis-
conceived. Encoding procedural concerns by redefining the outcome space
may, however, come at a cost. We will come back to this methodological
issue in Section 4.
We close this subsection with the following proposition which guarantees
the attainability of context independent quantifiers arising from preference
relations:
Proposition 3.2. Whenever f is a choice function arising from a partial
order , then the context-independent quantifier ϕ = f ◦ Im is attainable.
Proof. By the definition of ϕ we have that if r ∈ ϕ(p) then r is a maximal
element in Im(p). Hence we must have an x ∈ X be such that p(x) = r.
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3.2 Rational Preferences and Utility Functions
The usual approach to model behaviour in economics is to either postulate a
preference relation on the set of alternatives, as discussed above, or to directly
assume a utility function [10]. A certain structure is imposed on preference
relations mainly for two reasons: either because the additional structure is
deemed to be a characteristic of an agent’s rationality6, or because one wishes
to work with utility functions. It is a standard result that for utility functions
to exist, preferences relations have to be rational [10].
Now, rational preferences and utility functions are special cases of the
generic construction of a context-independent quantifier that we have out-
lined in the last section. Rational preferences are special because (i) we
impose additional structure on R, that is,  is a total preorder and (ii) we
focus on one particular f, that is, f : P(R)→ P(R) defined by
f(S) = { -maximal elements of S}
A rational preference relation can always be represented by a utility func-
tion. Translated into our higher-order approach, the utility function can be
characterised as the context p : X → R that attaches a real number to each
element of the set of choices X with the quantifier defined as
ϕ(p) = max
x∈X
p(x).
Moreover, this quantifier is attained by the selection function
ε(p) = argmax p
Note the types ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R) and ε : (X → R)→ P(X) respectively.
And indeed we have that
x ∈ ε(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ ϕ(p).
Thus, max and argmax operators, which are universally used in the economic
literature, are the prototypical examples of a context-independent quantifier
and a selection function attaining it. Since utility functions and preference
relations can be both represented by quantifiers we can conveniently work
with both representations in one model if represented in our framework.
As long as a rational preference relation is a good representation of a
decision problem, there is no obvious reason why not to use utility functions.
In fact, often utility functions are seen as more convenient because of the
6This issue has been intensely debated, see [14, 11, 10].
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availability of standard optimisation techniques. They also provide a succinct
description of the agent’s goals [15].
However, there are reasons why alternatives to maximisation are impor-
tant. Firstly, there are situations where utility functions are not applicable.
A canonical example is the case of lexicographic preferences. Secondly, in
the next section, we will show that higher-order functions also represent
decision procedures based on other than classical utility functions and pref-
erence relations. We will discuss why economists should care about having
such alternative representations at hand.
4 Alternatives to Optimisation
We have seen how the higher-order notion of a context-independent quanti-
fiers is able to model choices based on rational preferences (or equivalently
on utility maximisation). In this section we show that we can go beyond
these cases by allowing for a different structure on the set of outcomes R or
by allowing for a different mapping f : P(R)→ P(R), or by relaxing both.
Firstly, we show that quantifiers include decision procedures that can-
not be easily modelled by rational preference relations. Secondly, we will
argue that even if it were possible to model a decision problem by rational
preferences or utility maximisation, it may be insightful to have alternative
representations at hand.
Why should economists be interested in modelling behaviour differently,
if a representation of utility functions is possible? The main methodological
question is whether all decisions shall be modelled as being motivated by their
consequences. It is clear that in many situations it is possible to redefine the
outcome space such that procedural aspects or menu-dependence are encoded
in the outcome space. So why should economists be interested in alternatives
at all?
4.1 Beyond Rational Preferences
The assumption that the preorder on the outcome space is total, which guar-
antees the existence of a utility function, is demanding and in fact more
demanding than is necessary to rationalise choice behaviour [14]. When tak-
ing the perspective of preferences, from a positive as well as a normative
viewpoint, there are good reasons why a rational decision-maker may exhibit
indecisiveness, meaning that his preference for some pairs of outcomes may
not be defined [1]. Moreover, consider a situation where the economist or
some other agent has only partial information about the preferences of an
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agent and regards him “as if” he has incomplete preferences [3]. Lastly, R
may be a set of alternatives to be chosen by a group of agents. Even if each
individual’s preferences are complete, the aggregate social welfare ordering
does not have to be [13].
Sen [17] discusses “inescapability or urgency of choice” and situations
where the agent has to decide even if he has not totally ranked all alternatives.
As a result, no optimal choice in a classical sense can be made. However, Sen
[17] claims that completeness is not necessarily a condition for maximisation
which only requires that our chosen alternative is not known to be worse
than any other.
There have been various attempts to change standard formalisms to allow
for a utility theory without the need to fulfil the completeness assumption.7
When working with quantifiers and selection functions, the set of outcomes
R can have any order, or no underlying structure at all. In particular, the
preference relation does not have to be total. That is, given any preference
relation ⊆ R×R, an agent chooses the best alternatives as outlined above.
By that one can consider choices that are not in the scope of utility functions
without the need to change the framework. To be clear, the selection function
that corresponds to the preference ordering  is
argmax(p) = {x ∈ X | r  p(x) =⇒ r 6∈ Im(p)}
i.e. a maximal outcome is one which is not known to be worse than any
attainable outcome. It is important to notice that we may still have a total
quantifier, even if the preference relation is not total. Total quantifiers guar-
antee the existence of a preferred outcome even in a situation of incomplete
preferences.
4.2 Beyond Utility Functions
The utility approach is intimately linked to the assumption that the agent
fully optimises. The behavioural economic literature as well as the psycholog-
ical literature have documented deviations from optimising behaviour [2, 8].
Quantifiers provide a direct way to model such deviations. Here we give a
few examples how to represent these cases in our framework.
Example 4.1 (Averaging Agent). Consider an agent who prefers the out-
come to be as close as possible to the average of all achievable outcomes.
7For an important early contribution see [1]. More recent contributions include [13]
for utility representations in certain environments and [3] for uncertain environments. See
also references in [13].
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Given a decision context p : X → R, the average amongst the possible out-
comes can be calculated as
Ap =
Σr∈Im(p)r
| Im(p)|
Therefore, such agent can be directly modelled via the averaging quantifier
ϕA : (X → R)→ P(R) as
ϕA(p) = {r ∈ Im(p) | |r − Ap| is minimal}
Example 4.2 (Ideal-move Agent [6]). Let r > 0 be a fixed real number. For
a point v ∈ Rn we define the closed ball with centre v and radius r by
B(v; r) = {w ∈ Rn | d(v, w) ≤ r}
where d is the Euclidean distance. Let the set of choices X have a distin-
guished element x0 ∈ X. Define the quantifier ϕ : (X → R
n) → P(Rn)
by
ϕ(p) = B(p(x0); r)
This quantifier is attained by the constant selection function ε(p) = {x0}.
The last example illustrates Simon’s satisficing behaviour. The value
r > 0 can be considered as a satisficing threshold around outcomes that are
close to the outcome of an ideal point. Such an agent is equally satisfied with
all outcomes which are close enough to the outcome of the ideal choice.
The next example represents the second best decision problem discussed
in [9].
Example 4.3 (Second-best Agent). Consider a simple heuristic of a person
ordering wine in a restaurant whereby he always chooses the second most-
expensive wine. In terms of quantifiers, let X be the set of wines available in
a restaurant, and p : X → R the price attached to each wine xi (i = 1, ..., N)
on the menu, so that ri = p(xi) denotes the price of wine xi. Given a maximal
strict chain rn > rn−1 > . . . > r1 in R, let us call rn−1 a sub-maximal element.
The goal of the agent can be described by the quantifier
ϕ>(p
X→R) = {sub-maximal elements with respect to > within Im(p)}.
A crucial point of the above examples is the additional degree of freedom
of modelling as it is possible to vary the choice operator itself and not being
automatically restricted to the max operator and to consider behaviour to
be necessarily rationalised by rational preferences.
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Obviously, one could rationalise the above choices as the outcome of a
maximisation. One could redefine preferences and utility functions such that
the outcome of the maximisation is just the second most expensive wine.8
However, while equivalent in outcome, the causal model of behaviour is dif-
ferent. The classical approach would force the choice to be rational, whereas
in our setting this question remains open. The quantifier formally describes
an agent’s behaviour. It could be that the choice pattern is a habitual heuris-
tic or it could be the reduced form pattern of some rational decision making
in a larger context.
Of course, instead of choosing the second most expensive wine, one could
consider alternative heuristics, such as choosing the wine that is closest to
the average price of all available wines on the menu, or within a class of
wines, etc.
Moreover, one could also combine any heuristic with some arbitrary pref-
erences. Say, the guest is a fan of white wines, and he strictly prefers
Chardonnay over Riesling. One could model the agent as first restricting
the choices to the wines that are Chardonnay (if available) and then ap-
ply his second most expensive decision heuristic to the class of Chardonnay
available.
4.3 Context-Dependent Decision Problems
So far, we have focused only on context-independent quantifiers. We have
seen that already this restricted class of quantifiers can take us beyond choices
motivated by rational preferences. Yet, we can do more. As we have discussed
in Section 2, we can allow for quantifiers that do not only take the image of
p as input but the complete function. Again, we consider several examples.
Example 4.4 (Averaging – revised). Consider again an agent who prefers
the outcome to be as close as possible to the average outcome. But this time
we assume that he takes into account the number of possible ways an outcome
may be attained. Given a decision context p : X → R, the weighted average
in this case can be calculated as
Ap =
Σx∈Xp(x)
|X|
Such agent can be modelled via the weighted averaging quantifier ϕ : (X →
R)→ P(R) as
ϕ(p) = {r ∈ Im(p) | |r − Ap| is minimal}
8Note, if the prices of the wines represented preferences, a rationalisation of second
best choices is not possible (see [15]).
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It easy to check that this is a context-dependent quantifier.
Now, consider the example where the set of actions allows an agent to
earn some money but some actions are illicit and hence not considered to
be a permissible behaviour. If we care about the actions themselves, we
might not necessarily consider the largest sum of money as preferable. This
example corresponds to the discussion in ([17], section 6) and goes back to
Adam Smith (as quoted in [17]): “. . . conduct that go beyond the pursuit of
specified goals has a long tradition. As Adam Smith (1790) had noted, our
behavioural choices often reflect ‘general rules’ that ‘actions’ of a particular
sort ‘are to be avoided’ (p. 159)”.
Sen [17] proposes two methods in order to represent such situations, where
the first method is the one that is broadly used in the economic literature:
(1) Incorporate the context or concerns about actions explicitly into an
extended outcome space by rewriting the set of outcomes: all outcomes have
to be ranked by hand and payoffs are assigned accordingly. For example, this
can be done by attaching the appropriate negative values to all monetary
outcomes which are achieved by a criminal activity (note that we do not
mean the legal costs of criminal activities which can be easily monetised).
The agent then behaves “as if” he is maximising this new set.
(2) Restrict the choice options further by taking a permissible subset
of actions, reflecting self-imposed constraints or social norms of permissible
behaviour, and then seek the maximal outcome from the set of achievable
outcomes.
The optimal actions in the examples in [17] are the same if modelled
by these two approaches. There is, however, some critique of these meth-
ods. Regarding “as if” preferences Sen [17] notes that this new set is “. . . a
devised construction and need not have any intuitive plausibility seen as pref-
erence. A morally exacting choice constraint can lead to an outcome that the
person does not, in any sense, ‘desire’, but which simply mimics the effect
of his self-restraining constraint... The ‘as if ’ preference works well enough
formally, but the sociology of the phenomenon calls for something more than
the establishment of formal equivalences.”
Such new sets do not represent the original goals of the agents. It may be
transparent in a simple example, but not so in situations involving several
agents with different goals engaged in interactions. Moreover, we have to de-
rive such a set for each problem separately and cannot represent the original
goal as a general rule of conduct, that is combinable with some other con-
cerns, like: “in any arbitrary situation, first consider the socially permissible
actions and then maximise over outcomes which follows from permissible ac-
tions”. An additional complication arises if the preferences over actions are
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not just given, but are the product of some more general process, for example
a game. Then we have to rewrite the whole “as if” set each time the social
norms change.
The restriction function seems to represent the choice over the actions
in a more intuitive way, but only for some specific examples where some
actions are just thrown away from the consideration. It cannot represent
more complicated preferences over the action set. In our framework we can
consider arbitrary combinations of preferences over actions and outcomes.
For example, our agent can have a lexicographic ordering of permissible and
non-permissible actions or, alternatively, may pursue socially non-permissible
activities if they are not too profitable, but may consider them if the resulting
outcome is high enough.
Example 4.5 (Honest Agents). Consider an agent with a set of possible
actions X leading to monetary outcomes M ⊆ R. Assume some of these
actions I ⊂ X are illegal or dishonest. Hence, the set L = X\I consists of
the legal, or honest, actions. In the first instance consider an honest agent
who maximises over the outcomes which follows from honest actions. Such
a honest agent can be modelled by the quantifier:
ϕh(p) = {r | r a maximal element in the set p(L)}
where p(L) is the image of L under p. Consider, however, a more complicated
case where the agent is prepared to consider dishonest or illegal actions when
the reward associated with some of these actions is above a threshold T . This
subtler preference can be directly modelled as
ϕd(p) =
{
{r | r is maximal in Im(p)} if maxx∈I p(x) > T
ϕh(p) otherwise
so that the dishonest agent will behave as the honest one if the maximal
reward for a dishonest action is low, but he will consider any action to be
acceptable if the gain from a dishonest or illegal action is high enough.
In the next example we introduce an extreme case of an agent who decides
on preferred outcomes solely based on the set of moves that lead to that
outcome.
Example 4.6 (Safe Agents). Given a decision context p : X → R and an
outcome r ∈ Im(p), we can calculate the number of different ways r can be
attained by
npr = |{x ∈ X | p(x) = r}| .
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We say that an outcome r is most unavoidable if npr is maximal over the set
of possible outcomes Im(p). We say that an agent is safe if he prefers most
unavoidable outcomes. Such agents are modelled by the quantifier
φ(p) = {r ∈ Im(p) | npr maximal }
In order to illustrate this quantifier, suppose there are three beaches,
and the agent is indifferent between them. The first can be reached by one
highway, the second by two highways and the third by three highways. The
agent has to choose which highway to take, and the outcome is the beach
that the agent goes to. The safe agent decides to visit the beach which can
be reached by the most different routes, which is the third, in order to avoid
the risk of being stuck in a traffic jam.
5 Reflexive Agents
We now discuss the specific situations where the set of actions X and out-
comes R are the same X = R. In this case elements of the type
(X → X)→ P(X)
can be either viewed as quantifiers or selection functions. Agents of this type
are common in elections:
Example 5.1 (Voting Agent). Consider three judges J = {J1, J2, J3} voting
for two contestants X = {A,B}. The winner is determined by the simple
majority rule of type maj : X×X×X → X. The set X denotes both the set
of choices and the set of possible outcomes of the contest. We first assume
that the judges rank the contestants according to a preference ordering. For
example, suppose judges 1 and 2 prefer A and judge 3 prefers B. Consider
the decision problem of the first judge. He has an ordering on the set X,
namely A 1 B, and his goal is to maximise the outcome with respect to this
ordering. Hence, he is modelled via the quantifier:
ϕJ1 (p) = max
x∈(X,1)
p(x)
The set X is equipped with a partial order and the max operator (X →
X)→ P(X) describes the agent.
Another very interesting example of an agent with an important economic
interpretation, is the fixpoint operator, that we have already mentioned in
Section 2.3.
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Example 5.2 (Keynesian Agent). Consider the same example as in the last
example but now assume that judge 1 has different preferences: he prefers
to support the winner of the contest. He is only interested in voting for
the winner of the contest and he has no preferences for the contestants per
se. The selection function of such a Keynesian agent can be described by a
fixpoint operator as
εK1 (p) = fix(p) = {x ∈ X | p(x) = x}.
Interestingly, such an agent is best described by a selection function, rather
than via the corresponding quantifier
ϕK1 (p) = {p(x) | p(x) = x}.
We note that it is perfectly possible to model such a Keynesian agent
via standard utility functions, attaching say utility 1 to good outcomes and
0 to the bad ones, so that the judges maximise over the set of monetary
payoffs. In this process of attaching utilities to the decision, however, one
has to compute the outcome of the votes, then to check for the second and
the third judges whether their vote is in line with the outcome, and finally
to attach the utilities. In some sense, the economist takes the whole decision
process, solves the problem, identifies the good outcomes according to the
natural language description of the problem, and then lets the agent to choose
between 1 and 0.
On the other hand, if we use the fixpoint operator in order to represent
the goal, we equip the individual agent himself with the problem solving
ability that we as the modeller otherwise use in order to compute the utility
such that the utility maximising agent behaves as if he were a Keynesian
agent. We have been therefore tempted to call such fixpoint agents reflexive
agents as they do inside the model what the economist is doing outside the
model. These fixpoint agents with their computational power resemble a
construction that is at the core of the Lucas critique.9
As briefly discussed above, most functions p : X → X do not have a
fixpoint and the fixpoint operator will often give the empty set. For the
purposes of modelling a particular situation we might want to totalise the
fixpoint operator in different ways and describe what an agent might do in
9Sargent [16] describes the need for a similarity of the economist and the economically
reasoning agents in the economists’ models as follows: “[t]he idea of rational expecta-
tions is ... said to embody the idea that economists and the agents they are modeling
should be placed on the equal footing: the agents in the model should be able to forecast
and profit-maximize and utility-maximize as well as the economist -or should we say the
econometrician - who constructed the model.”
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case that no fixpoint exists. The fixpoint goals are far more interesting when
we consider a game with several agents with different concerns, for instance
some with usual preferences and some with fixpoint goals. We analyse such
a game in detail in our companion paper on higher-order games [7].
Let us conclude with another example of a reflexive agent.
Example 5.3 (Coordinating Agent). Consider two players, {0, 1}, who want
to coordinate, for instance, about the restaurant where to meet for lunch. The
set of actions X0 = X1 = {A,B} denotes the different restaurants at choice.
The set of outcomes R = X0 × X1 denotes the two restaurants where the
agents might end up. The fact that these two agents want to meet in the
same restaurant ca be directly described by another sort of fixpoint operator:
εi(p) = {x ∈ Xi | x = (pi1−i ◦ p)(x)}
where pii : X0×X1 → Xi are the projection functions. The preferred move of
agent i is the one which leads him to the same place as the other agent 1− i.
These two examples above show that the overall goal of the Keynesian and
the coordinating agent are very similar, and can be captured by some variants
of fixpoint operators. Even though it is possible to use utility functions in
order to model these concerns in the particular examples, it is not so obvious
that this commonality can be made explicit when modelling with utility
functions. In our more abstract formalisation via higher-order functions, it
is possible to detect patterns across problems that are hard to find when one
only looks at the compiled level of utility maximisation.
6 Conclusions
The utility maximisation framework of standard decision theory is an in-
tuitive representation of rational agents and the yardstick approach in eco-
nomics. The rationale for adhering to this approach is that modelling tools,
such as functional analysis as well as solution methods, such as optimisation
via Lagrangian methods, are readily available. However, theory, reality and
experiments suggest that we need to go beyond the modelling strategy of
representing any behaviour as if it were the result of utility maximisation.
Moreover, it is not straightforward how to implement utility maximisation
in computers or take into account computability issues for example for the
real numbers of utility maximisation.
Our higher-order approach offers a path to resolve both of these issues: we
can generalise utility maximisation. At the same time higher-order functions
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provide a way to implement our games in computers. Higher-order functions
generalise the max and argmax operators, and as the foundation of com-
putability theory, programming language and compiler design and computer
science in general, they form a way to implement models in computers and
analyse decision models with the tools to analyse software.
Another, very important issue of the higher-order functions is that they
equip our decision framework with the feature of programming languages be-
ing compositional. In this paper we have seen how various decision goals are
composable, in our companion paper [7] we show that this extends to games
as well. Games are composable from decisions and furthermore algebraically
composable into any complicated game.
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